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IS THE BURFORD ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
STILL VIABLE IN THE OIL AND GAS
INDUSTRY?
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts have a duty to rule on controversies properly brought
before them.I However, the Supreme Court has developed the abstention
doctrine as a narrow exception to this rule.2 Proper circumstances for
the exercise of the abstention doctrine are confined to categories which
focus on state law or proceedings.3 When a federal court decides that
abstention is appropriate in a given case, it may exercise its equitable
powers4 and decline to exercise jurisdiction in the case.5
II. THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The commerce clause grants Congress the authority to regulate
commerce among the states.6 Yet, absent a contrary federal law, a state
may exercise its police power over matters of genuine local concern de-
spite the impact of such regulations on interstate commerce.7 Oklahoma,
Mississippi, and Kansas have asserted their right to regulate interstate
1. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
2. Id.
3. While the Supreme Court has vacillated in its holdings as to the number of abstention
doctrines which it recognizes, the circumstances generally deemed to be appropriate for the applica-
tion of the abstention doctrine are: (1) in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which might
be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law;
(2) when absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has
been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings, state nuisance proceedings, or
collection of state taxes; (3) when the Burford abstention doctrine is appropriate due to difficult
questions concerning state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose impor-
tance transcends the result in the case at bar; and 4) where there are "exceptional" circumstances,
such as the inconvenience of the federal forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and
the order in which jurisdiction is obtained by the concurrent forums, which permit a federal court to
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction for reasons of wise judicial administration due to the presence
of a concurrent state proceeding. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §§ 4241-47 (1978); see also Shapiro v. Cooke, 552 F. Supp. 581 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
4. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964).
5. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3.
7. Middle S. Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 772 F.2d 404, 411 (8th Cir. 1985)
(citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978)).
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gas based on their police power to prevent waste and to protect correla-
tive rights.' However, the adoption of federal law regulating interstate
gas preempts the states' regulation in this area.9 Furthermore, the ab-
stention doctrine is inapplicable to questions concerning state regulation
of interstate gas because preemption eliminates all unsettled state law
questions and eliminates the need to protect state regulatory schemes.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BURFORD ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
A. Preemption Doctrine
The supremacy clause1" provides that where an actual conflict exists
between a federal law and a state law, the federal law must "preempt"
the state law." Furthermore, when Congress exercises a constitution-
ally-based power, any concurrent and conflicting state law may be nulli-
fied pursuant to the preemption doctrine.' 2 The Supreme Court case of
Pennsylvania v. Nelson 13 provides the test for application of the preemp-
tion doctrine. In that case, a federal statute prohibiting the knowing ad-
vocacy of the overthrow of the national government by force and
violence was held to supersede a similarly worded Pennsylvania statute. 14
Chief Justice Warren described the test for application of the preemption
doctrine as follows: (1) that the federal regulatory scheme is pervasive,
(2) that the statutes involved affect a field where the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal regulatory system must be presumed to pre-
clude the enforcement of concurrent state statutes, and (3) that serious
danger of conflict exists between state laws and the administration of the
federal program. 5 The courts have consistently ruled in favor of pre-
emption in prior instances involving conflicting federal and state laws.
8. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409 (1986); North-
ern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n of Okla., 643 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
9. Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717z (1982); Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3432 (1982).
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 295 (3d ed. 1986).
12. Id.
13. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
14. Id. at 509. Chief Justice Warren, in the Court's opinion, wrote: "[W]e find that Congress
has occupied the field to the exclusion of parallel state legislation, that the dominant interest of the
Federal Government precludes state intervention, and that the administration of state Acts would
conflict with the operation of the federal plan ...." Id. The Court affirmed the holding of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the Smith Act superseded the Pennsylvania Sedition Act therefore
precluding enforcement of the Pennsylvania Act against a person charged with seditious acts against
the Federal Government. Id.
15. Id. at 502-06.
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The abstention doctrine, a "judge-made" doctrine,16 was espoused
by the Supreme Court in 194117 and has subsequently been refined into
several distinct types."i This doctrine developed primarily because of
federalism and the desire to preserve harmony between the federal and
state governments. 19 Under certain circumstances, the doctrine permits
a federal court to withhold consideration of a case and defer the matter
to a state court, even though it has jurisdiction. However, the abstention
doctrine should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances.20
1. Burford Abstention Doctrine
In 1943, the Supreme Court developed the second type of abstention
doctrine in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.21 The Burford abstention doctrine
permits a federal court to defer action to a state court despite the exist-
ence of concurrent jurisdiction in order to avoid unnecessary interference
with state activities.22 The Burford court considered the conflicting and
concurrent jurisdictions of the Texas and federal courts and held that the
federal court should defer to the state court where the action involved a
state activity.
23
The Court based its holding on the state activities in the regulation
and administration of energy policies. Texas had developed a general
16. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
17. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 429
(1978).
18. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 17, at 465.
20. Duke v. James, 713 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1983).
21. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Justice Black's opinion held that "[t]hese questions of regulation of
the industry by the state administrative agency, whether involving gas or oil prorationing programs
or Rule 37 cases, so clearly involves basic problems of Texas policy that equitable discretion should
be exercised to give the Texas courts the first opportunity to consider them." Id. at 332. For a
discussion of the Burford doctrine see generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 308 (4th
ed. 1983).
22. Burford, 319 U.S. at 322-24.
23. Id. at 334. Sun Oil Company sought injunctive relief in federal court against the enforce-
ment of an exception order issued by the ARC. Id. at 316-17. The RRC is the administrative
agency charged with the duty of making and enforcing oil and gas conservation and production rules
in Texas. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 998-99 (7th ed.
1987). The RRC's rule 37 had provided for certain minimum spacing between wells while also
allowing exceptions when necessary to prevent waste and to protect correlative rights. The excep-
tion order in Burford involved an exception to rule 37's minimum well spacing requirement granted
to Burford for the drilling of four wells on a small tract of land in the East Texas Field. Burford, 319
U.S. at 322. Jurisdiction was based on the diversity of citizenship of the parties and because the
plaintiffs claimed that the exception order denied them due process of law. Id. at 317.
1988]
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regulatory scheme to promote the conservation of oil and gas by mini-
mizing loss and waste.24 The state legislature had given the Texas Rail-
road Commission (RRC) the responsibility of fact finding and policy
making 25 and had given the state courts the power to test the reasonable-
ness of the RRC orders.26  Furthermore, the legislature made direct re-
view of RRC orders available only in the state district courts of Travis
County27 in order to ensure uniformity of interpretation and avoid con-
fusion which would result from multiple review of the same general is-
sues.2" The court noted that limiting access to judicial review allowed
the state courts, like the RRC, to develop expertise in the regulation and
administration of energy policies. However, the court determined that
confusion had resulted from the exercise of federal equity jurisdiction
despite actions by the Texas legislature in limiting review to one court.29
The Court relied on the general proposition that even if a federal
court has jurisdiction over a matter, it may refuse to exercise its jurisdic-
tion where it would be contrary to a state's public interest.3 0  Because
questions concerning the RRC's regulation of the oil industry clearly in-
volved Texas policy, the Texas state courts should have the first opportu-
nity to consider them.31  The court concluded that the federal court
should stay its proceedings because Texas had a system of policy formu-
lation and judicial review involving the RRC and the state courts.3 2 Fur-
thermore, review by the state court was prompt and thorough, and the
review in the federal court would only be contrary to the success of state
policies.33  Therefore, the rule in Burford permits a federal court to al-
low a state to hear a matter even though a federal court has jurisdiction.
2. Application of the Burford Abstention Doctrine
Courts have considered the Burford abstention doctrine on numer-
ous occasions. However, while recognizing the validity of Burford,34 the
24. Id. at 332.
25. Id. at 326 (citing Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73
(1939)).
26. Id. (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Shell Oil Co., 39 Tex. 66, 161 S.W.2d 1022 (1942) and
Railroad Comm'n v. Gulf Production Co., 134 Tex. 122, 132 S.W.2d 254 (1939)).
27. Austin, the capital city of Texas, is the county seat of Travis County as well as the location
of the Railroad Commission of Texas.
28. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 326 (1943).
29. Id. at 327.
30. Id. at 317-18.
31. Id. at 332.
32. Id. at 333-34.
33. Id. at 334.
34. Duke v. James, 713 F.2d 1506, 1510 n.19 (llth Cir. 1983).
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courts have been reluctant to apply it in recent times. The courts have
principally applied the doctrine in situations when invoking federal juris-
diction would disrupt the administration of state regulatory schemes or
when a plaintiff is seeking to restrain a state official from exercising au-
thority.35 Further, courts have used the doctrine when invoking federal
jurisdiction would interfere with state attempts to formulate a coherent
state policy.36 However, courts have refused to apply the doctrine when
the state had no overriding interest in the determination of the issue the
federal court is asked to consider.37
a. Middle South Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission
The applicability of the Burford abstention doctrine was examined
in Middle South Energy, Inc. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission.38
The court was petitioned by the Arkansas Public Service Commission
(APSC) to abstain from considering the challenge by Middle South En-
ergy (MSE) regarding the constitutionality of the actions of the APSC
pending the outcome of APSC's proceedings. The APSC sought to de-
clare MSE contracts to purchase power from a Mississippi nuclear power
plant void ab initio. The APSC believed that the cost of such power
would result in enormous rate increases for Arkansas customers.39 How-
ever, because the power plant was a cooperative effort involving public
utilities in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi,' the court determined
35. Bergeron v. Estate of Loeb, 777 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986)
involved claims based on both state and federal securities laws. The First Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision to dismiss the state law claims and to grant summary judgment on the federal
law claims. The court held that the Burford abstention doctrine had no application in the matter.
The court further stated that the case did not involve the threat of assumption of federal jurisdiction
disrupting the orderly administration of state regulatory schemes or a plaintiff in a diversity action
seeking to restrain a state official from exercising vested authority. Id. at 796-800.
36. Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). This case in-
volved a claim over which the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction. The United States
Supreme Court, holding that none of the three categories of the abstention doctrine applied to this
case, ruled that Burford was not applicable because the state law involved was settled and the deci-
sion would not impair efforts to implement state policy. Id.
37. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Hufo Oils, 626 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Tex. 1985). The court
held that the application of the abstention doctrine was improper since Colorado Interstate's claims
only involved matters of private contract rights. Consequently, there was no unsettled issue of state
law or a possibility that state law determination would moot any federal constitutional question
raised in a federal proceeding. Id.
38. 772 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985).
39. Id. at 412.
40. Arkansas Power & Light Company, Louisiana Power & Light Company, Mississippi Power
& Light Company, and New Orleans Public Service, Inc. are each wholly-owned subsidiaries of
Middle South Utilities, Inc. These companies provide electric service to customers in Arkansas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. Because the need for additional power generating facilities was foreseen
in the early 1970's, the construction of the nuclear power plant was proposed. However, because the
5
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that the cancellation of the contracts by the APSC would merely shift the
financial burden of the project to Mississippi and Louisiana citizens who
had no direct influence on Arkansas' internal affairs."a
The court based its holding on the commerce clause and also found
that the Burford abstention doctrine was inappropriate. The court up-
held the injunction against the APSC proceeding because the APSC's
intent to protect Arkansas' economic interest "resulted in an impermissi-
ble burden on interstate commerce. 4a2 Therefore, the APSC proceedings
were unconstitutional as violations of the commerce clause. Further-
more, the court stated that when the constitution or federal laws have
preempted an area, the state has no regulatory scheme to protect. Conse-
quently, the Burford abstention doctrine was held to be inappropriate.43
b. Canaday v. Koch
The Burford abstention doctrine was considered by the district court
in Canaday v. Koch.' The court in Canaday considered concurrent
state and federal laws regarding emergency housing for homeless fami-
lies. The court relied on the basic premise of Burford which is to prevent
federal interference with state attempts to establish state policy.45 How-
ever, the court also noted that while the federal court should not abstain
in cases where the state law is clear on the issues presented,46 the federal
court may be compelled to abstain where the issues pertain to predomi-
nantly local matters.47
Although the court recognized other important factors, 8 the
operating subsidiaries did not have sufficient resources to finance the construction of the plant, Mid-
dle South Utilities formed Middle South Energy to finance the project. Consequently, each operat-
ing subsidiary contracted to purchase power from the plant, and those contracts were used to obtain
financing for the plant. Id. at 406-07.
41. Id. at 417.
42. Id. at 412.
43. Id. at 417.
44. 608 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
45. Id. at 1467. The court ruled that the Pullman doctrine requires: (1) that the state statute
must be unclear or the issue of the state law be uncertain, (2) that resolution of the federal issue
depends upon the interpretation given to the state law, and (3) that the state law be susceptible of an
interpretation that would avoid or modify the federal constitutional issue. Since the court found that
the federal issue was not dependent on the interpretation of state law, the Pullman doctrine did not
apply. Id.
46. Id. at 1468-69 (citing Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 53 (1933)).
47. Id. at 1468.
48. Id. at 1469. One factor is the importance of the subject matter of the action to the state and
the manner in which the state chooses to handle the problem presented. Id. The court noted by way
of example that in New Mexico, cases "presenting questions of access to water are of intense local
interest and of predominantly local concern." Id. The court held that abstention is warranted under
such circumstances. The court also held that the same could be said of cases involving intrastate
[Vol. 23:653
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Canaday court held that the Burford abstention doctrine was properly
applied because the case involved an issue of predominantly local con-
cern. Furthermore, the pertinent state law was unsettled and unclear,
and the local officials were attempting to develop a coherent state policy
to address the issue.49
The abstention doctrine was formulated to improve the relationship
between state and federal authority.5" However, the doctrine enjoyed its
most frequent use during Justice Frankfurter's tenure on the Court.51
Although the doctrine's use has in fact declined, it is still used in specific
situations.5 2
IV. BURFORD ABSTENTION DOCTRINE INAPPROPRIATE IN
PREEMPTED AREA
State regulation of interstate commerce, pursuant to an exercise of
the state's police power over matters of legitimate local concern, is per-
missible where no conflicting federal law exists. 3 However, the su-
premacy clause54 provides that federal law "preempts" conflicting state
law. 5 Therefore, abstention may not be exercised in areas where state
law has been preempted by federal law because no state policy needs to
be protected.
56
A. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission
Northern Natural57 involved a conflict between state agency require-
ments and the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission (FPC).i8
transportation facilities. Id. Also, the "[e]xistence of a comprehensive system of state administrative
decision making with specified channels of judicial review" is an important consideration in deter-
mining the applicability of Burford. Id. Another factor was that while the presence of a federal
constitutional issue is a factor which favors exercising jurisdiction by a federal court, a constitutional
claim does notknecessarily bar abstention. Id.
49. Id.
50. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
5 1. See supra note 15, at 95-98. Justice Frankfurter, who authored the Court's opinion in Pull-
man, as well as a concurring opinion in Burford, retired in 1962.
52. See supra note 1.
53. Middle S. Energy, 772 F.2d at 411.
54. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
55. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 295 (3d ed. 1986).
56. Baggett v. Dep't of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Pilot Comm'rs, 717 F.2d 521, 524 (1 th
Cir. 1983).
57. 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
58. Northern Natural, 372 U.S. at 85-86. The Federal Power Commission was terminated and
its functions, personnel, property, funds, etc. were transferred to the Secretary of Energy (except for
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Agency regulations required an interstate pipeline company to ratably
purchase from all wells connected to its pipeline system. 9 Northern
Natural had gas purchase contracts with numerous producers in Kansas'
Hugoton Field; however, its oldest contract required it to take the maxi-
mum production allowed from that producer's wells. Although North-
ern Natural's other gas purchase contacts were expressly subject to the
contract, Northern Natural was nonetheless able to purchase on an es-
sentially ratable basis.60 In 1958, Northern Natural was forced by lack
of market demand and by the terms of its oldest contract to reduce the
purchases from the other producers to less than their production allow-
ables. The Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) then issued its order
requiring Northern Natural to purchase ratably from all of the producers
in the Hugoton Field.61
The Court held that the KCC order was preempted by the FPC's
exclusive jurisdiction over sale and transportation of natural gas for re-
sale granted by the NGA.62 The Court found that the federal regula-
tions left no room for state regulations.63 Therefore, the order was
invalid because the KCC order directly affected the FPC's ability to reg-
ulate transportation and sale of natural gas and to achieve the NGA's
goal of uniform regulation." Furthermore, the Court held that where
Congress has pervaded the regulatory field, the state, not the federal, reg-
ulation must be preempted. Also, while acknowledging the power of
the states to allocate and conserve its natural resources, the Court con-
cluded that the scope of this power was limited to production of those
natural resources and did not extend to the transportation and sale of the
same.
66
59. Northern Natural, 372 U.S. at 85-86.
60. Id. at 86-87.
61. Id. at 88-89.
62. Id. at 89. The Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982) provides the following:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to the transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce, to the sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate con-
sumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas compa-
nies engaged in such transportation or sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation
or sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for
such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.
63. Northern Natural, 372 U.S. at 91.
64. Id. at 91-92.
65. Id. at 93.
66. Id. at 94.
[Vol. 23:653
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B. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Board
The Court applied reasoning similar to Northern Natural Transcon-
tinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Board (Transco) to hold
that Mississippi's ratable take requirement was preempted by the NGA
and NGPA.67 Transco had entered into several gas purchase contracts
with producers in Mississippi's Harper Sand Field during a period of
high market demand for gas production. At the same time, Transco also
made numerous non-contract purchases from other producers in the field
to meet its demand for gas.68 As the market demand decreased, Transco
suspended its non-contract purchases. Subsequently, one of the non-
contract producers in the Harper Sand Field filed a petition with the
Mississippi Oil and Gas Board (the Board) seeking enforcement of its
rule 48 "ratable take" requirement.69
The Mississippi courts upheld rule 48 based on their determination
that the NGPA had overruled Northern Natural.7" The Board had found
Transco in violation of rule 48 and had ordered Transco to make ratable
purchases from all of the Harper Sand Field producers. Transco had
appealed the order to the Mississippi Circuit Court and, subsequently, to
the Mississippi Supreme Court. Both courts held that the NGPA had
effectively overruled Northern Natural and that the Board's authority
was not preempted by the NGA because the NGPA removed the trans-
portation and sale of "high-cost" gas7 from the FERC's jurisdiction.72
Consequently, Transco appealed these holdings to the United States
Supreme Court.
In Transco, the Court held that Mississippi's regulation subverted
67. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 425 (1986).
Transco executed contracts with Getty and Tomlinson Interests, Inc., whereby Transco was obli-
gated to purchase only Getty and Tomlinson's shares of gas produced from wells they operated.
Transco also executed a contract with Florida Exploration Company whereby Transco was obligated
to take all gas produced by Florida's wells regardless of whether Florida owned the production or
not. Id. at 412-13.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 414. Mississippi's Oil & Gas Board Statewide Rule 48 provides that "[e]ach person
now or hereafter engaged in the business of purchasing oil or gas from owners, operators, or produ-
cers shall purchase without discrimination in favor of one owner, operator, or producer against
another in the same common source of supply." Id.
70. Id. at 415.
71. Id. 15 U.S.C. § 3317(c)(1) (1982) states the following:
For purposes of this section, the term "high-cost natural gas" means natural gas deter-
mined in accordance with Section 3413 of this title to be-
(1) produced from any well the surface drilling of which began on or after February
19, 1977, if such production is from a completion location which is located at a depth of
more than 15,000 feet.
72. Transco, 474 U.S. at 414-15.
1988]
9
Knight: Is the Burford Abstention Doctrine Still Viable in the Oil and Ga
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23:653
Congress' determination that the supply, the demand, and the price of
"high-cost" gas should be determined by the marketplace.73 The Court
found that Congress, by enacting the NGPA, attempted to increase ex-
ploration by removing the transportation and resale of "high-cost" gas
from the FERC's regulation. 4 Furthermore, the court stated that re-
moval of jurisdiction from the FERC cannot be interpreted as an invita-
tion to the states to increase their regulation.75 Also, the Court in
Transco held that allowance of state regulation of "high-cost" gas would
disrupt the uniformity of the federal regulatory scheme, contribute to
increased costs to the consumer, and therefore would be contrary to the
goals of the NGPA.76
C. ANR Pipeline Co. v. The Corporation Commission of Oklahoma
ANR Pipeline Co. v. The Corporation Commission of Oklahoma,7"
like Northern Natural and Transco before it, presented the court with the
question of whether a state's ratable take provision conflicted with the
federal regulatory scheme. The court held in ANR, as did the Supreme
Court in Northern Natural and Transco, that the state's regulations were
unconstitutional because they interfered with the federal regulatory
73. Id. at 422. Congress enacted the NGA in 1938 in response to Supreme Court decisions
which held state regulation of interstate pipelines to be unconstitutional under the commerce clause
of the Constitution. Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924); Oklahoma v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). The scope of the NGA included transportation of natural gas
in interstate commerce, sales of natural gas for resale in interstate commerce, and companies engag-
ing in either transportation or sales for resale of natural gas in interstate commerce. Natural Gas
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1982). The FPC was in charge of administration of the NGA and was
granted broad authority in rate-setting in interstate transportation and sales for resale of natural gas.
Id. at § 717d (1982). However, the NGA's pricing structure increasingly caused new production to
be diverted from the interstate market to unregulated intrastate markets until the under supply of
the interstate market reached crisis proportions in the mid-70's. See Transco, 474 U.S. at 420. Con-
gress therefore enacted the NGPA in 1978 eliminating the price differences between the interstate
and intrastate markets. Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-42 (1982).
74. Transco, 474 U.S. at 420.
75. Id. at 423-24.
76. Id. Prior to the enactment of the Natural Gas Act in 1938, the Supreme Court had held
previous efforts by the states to regulate interstate pipelines unconstitutional under the commerce
clause of the Constitution. See Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924); Oklahoma
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). In Transco, while the Mississippi Supreme Court
held that ratable take requirements were not violative of the commerce clause, the United States
Supreme Court held that preemption of ratable take requirements by the NGA and NGPA pre-
cluded the necessity of determining whether Mississippi's action was nevertheless preempted by the
commerce clause. Transco, 474 U.S. at 425. However, Justice Rehnquist's minority opinion held
that such requirements are not violative of the commerce clause. Id. at 435 (citing Cities Service Gas
Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950)). Consequently, a reversal of the holding in
Transco would not only allow ratable take to avoid preemption by the NGA and NGPA but also
avoid conflict with the commerce clause.
77. 643 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
10
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scheme. Consequently, in ANR the court ruled that the state regulation,
in this case a regulation of Oklahoma, was invalid as preempted by the
NGA and NGPA 78 despite the argument of the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission (the Commission) that the Burford abstention doctrine
should be invoked.79
The issue considered by the court in ANR was whether Oklahoma's
ratable take provision, section 240, and the rules promulgated thereun-
der, particularly rule 1-305, were preempted by federal law. The purpose
of rule 1-30580 was to establish the priority in which natural gas produc-
tion was to be taken by pipeline companies in the event of a market de-
mand/supply imbalance.8 Further, the rule provides for the ratable
taking of gas when the supply exceeds the market demand. The commis-
sion referred to section 240 as its basis of authority to enact rule 1-305.
Section 240, the ratable take requirement, provides that purchasers of
natural gas in Oklahoma must purchase all natural gas offered for sale to
them without favoring one source of supply over another.
82
The Commission asserted that even if the court had jurisdiction over
the matter, it should have applied the Burford abstention doctrine and
deferred consideration of the constitutionality of the statute to the state
courts.83 The Commission argued that the Burford abstention doctrine
was applicable because Oklahoma's regulatory policy of correlative
rights and preventing waste would be disrupted by federal interference.
Additionally, Oklahoma courts have special knowledge concerning this
policy, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals of commission orders. Also, the question involved an Oklahoma
regulatory agency, and the Oklahoma state courts provided an adequate
remedy.84
Finally, the Commission claimed that rule 1-305 was not only a
product of section 240, a ratable take statute, but that it was also based
on section 239, a ratable production statute." Asserting that the scope
78. Id. at 423-24.
79. See Initial Brief for Corporation Commission of Oklahoma at 16, ANR, 643 F. Supp. 419
(W.D. Okla. 1986) (No. 85-1929A) [hereinafter cited as Initial Brief].
80. Rule 1-305, 1 Okla. Reg. 37-38 (1983).
81. Id.
82. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 240 (1981).
83. See Initial Brief, supra note 79, at 15.
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 239 (1981) provides the following:
Whenever the full production from any common source of supply of natural gas in this
state is in excess of the market demands, then any person, firm or corporation, having the
right to drill into and produce gas from any such common source of supply, may take
1988]
11
Knight: Is the Burford Abstention Doctrine Still Viable in the Oil and Ga
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
of the NGA and the NGPA was limited to the wellhead price of inter-
state gas, to the cost structures of interstate pipelines, and to the supply
and cost of gas for the consumer, the Commission maintained that the
state retained jurisdiction over conservation. Consequently, the Com-
mission claimed that the ratable take provision in Transco was unconsti-
tutional because it was based exclusively on regulation of interstate
pipelines. The Oklahoma provision, however, differed because it regu-
lated producers and production as well as the pipelines8 6 and was
constitutional.
Despite the Commission's claim of the applicability of the Burford
abstention doctrine to the circumstances present in ANR, the court found
section 240 to be unconstitutional because it was "apurchase statute."87
Therefore, the statute was an invasion of the FERC's exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the transportation and sale for resale of interstate natural gas.
Furthermore, the court held that a comparison of Oklahoma's ratable
take statute and order with the regulations held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in Northern Natural and Transco result in a determina-
tion that all three devices regulate the taking of gas.88
In ANR, the court also held that Oklahoma's section 240 and rule 1-
305 were similar to the regulations in Northern Natural and Transco be-
cause they attempted to prevent discrimination in favor of any one com-
mon source of supply to the detriment of another. This type of
regulation would permit an individual state to "skew the free market of
gas." Consequently, the court held this to be contrary to the federal pol-
icy of permitting the gas market price to be determined by the free flow
of interstate commerce.89 Therefore, section 240 and rule 1-305 were
therefrom only such proportion of the natural gas that may be marketed without waste, as
the natural flow of the well or wells owned or controlled by any such person, firm or
corporation bears of the total natural flow of such common source of supply having due
regard to the acreage drained by each well, so as to prevent any such person, firm or
corporation securing any unfair proportion of the gas therefrom ....
86. Southern Natural Gas Co.'s Brief in Opposition to ANR's Motion for Summary Judgment
and Northwest Central's Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2,
ANR, 643 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (No. 86-1929A).
87. ANR, 643 F. Supp. at 422. The court held that a comparison of Oklahoma's section 240
and rule 1-305 with Kansas' statute 550-703 and Mississippi's rule 48, which were held to be uncon-
stitutional in Northern Natural and Transco, compelled the decision that all three devices were in-
tended to result in the regulation of the taking of natural gas by pipeline purchasers. Furthermore,
the court held that the Commission's order of July 3, 1985, which asserted that rule 1-305 was also a
product of section 239, a statute which regulated the amount of natural gas that would be produced,
and which was issued a year and a half after the effective date of rule 1-305, had no effect on its
holding. Id. at 422-23.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 423.
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In relying on Northern Natural and Transco to declare Oklahoma's
ratable take provisions unconstitutional, the court in ANR chose not to
address the applicability of Burford regarding the issue of the effect such
provisions have on natural gas in interstate commerce. The Commission
claimed that Burford should apply in ANR because all the factors neces-
sary for its application were present.90 However, the issue of application
of Oklahoma's ratable take provision to natural gas in interstate com-
merce is not one of predominantly local concern, but instead is one of
national concern. Furthermore, the pertinent state law -is neither unset-
tled nor unclear because such laws were held to be unconstitutional by
the Court in Northern Natural and Transco.
V. CONCLUSION
The ideological balance of the Supreme Court has arguably shifted
since the holding in Transco was announced. This shift could result in a
holding that ratable take provisions are applicable to some types of inter-
state gas. Consequently, the applicability of such provisions could once
again become unsettled and unclear. The state's prevention of waste and
protection of correlative rights may become the predominant concern as
the depletion of current reserves continues to exceed the discovery of
replacement reserves. However, barring a reversal of the holdings in
Northern Natural and Transco, the Burford abstention doctrine has no
application in situations involving natural gas in interstate commerce.
Jeffrey D. Knight
90. See Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion to
Abstain at 16, ANR, 643 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. OkIa. 1986) (No. 85-1929A).
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